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Abstract
This article aims to discuss what factors have determined the de-
velopment of the Norwegian shipbuilding and ship repair industry after 
1945, and how it’s place in the industrial structure has changed in the af-
ter-war epoch. In addition to market conditions and political regulations, a 
structural change in the way capital operates in the industry is important. 
We will also discuss the system of industrial relations developed in this 
branch.
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La industria naval noruega y 
el ascenso del Grupo Aker
Resumen
Este artículo tiene como objetivo analizar los factores que deter-
minaron el desarrollo de la industria naval noruega, y cómo ha cambiado 
su lugar en la estructura industrial desde la segunda posguerra. Consider-
amos, además de las condiciones del mercado y las regulaciones políticas, 
la importancia del cambio estructural en la forma en que opera el capital 
en la industria. También debatimos el sistema de relaciones laborales de-
sarrollado en esta rama.
Palabras clave:
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1. Introduction
Norway is a small country, with a population in 2019 of about 5,3 
million. Around 1950, it was less than 3,3 million. Despite this, Norwe-
gian shipbuilding firms have in periods played an important part in the 
world’s shipbuilding industry. Since the 19th Century, the country has had 
one of the world’s largest merchant fleets, and shipyards emerged to cater 
for a large home market for ship repair and building of new ships, copying 
technology and taking over market shares from British shipbuilders.
In 1950, the shipbuilding industry employed around 18,000 peo-
ple, seven percent of the industrial labour force. In 2017, about 18,000 
also worked in the building of ships and oil platforms (8 % of the work 
force in industry), according to official statistics.3 If we look at the pro-
duction value, it amounted to 5 % of the total for industry in 1950 and 7 
3 See appendix, table 1 and table 4. It must be noted that these figures are merely 
rough indicators, and that they are not directly comparable over time, since the 
basis for categorizing has changed several times. Because of such changes, the 
number of employed in 2017 is underestimated, so that in fact the number would 
be higher if counted on the same grounds as in 1950.
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% in 2017.4 The fortunes of the sector have oscillated, and there have been 
major internal changes during this period. But the sector as a whole has 
survived the crises and market problems without losing its position in the 
economic structure.
This article aims to discuss what factors have determined the de-
velopment of the Norwegian shipbuilding and ship repair industry after 
1945, and how its place in the industrial structure has changed during the 
post-war years. In addition to market conditions and the labour produc-
tivity of the yards, political regulations have been important, and we con-
sider how state intervention has influenced its survival. We also discuss 
the role of labour relations. The concept of “the Nordic model of labour 
relations” has played an important role in public debate on the competitive 
power of industry, implying that it denotes a specific variant of capitalism, 
characterized by relations of trust and cooperation between managers and 
workers and their organisations.5 We discuss the role of this system of la-
bour relations in the success of shipbuilding and how these relations have 
changed.
The framework for our analysis is a periodization in three dis-
tinct periods. Like in the rest of the world, there was a decisive turning 
point in the fortunes of shipbuilding in the mid-1970s caused by the ship-
ping crisis. In the Norwegian case, one could say that a continuous pro-
duction cycle started after the war and ended around 1975. During this 
period, production volume and employment increased. In the next phase 
the sector underwent a major restructuring as firms were adapting to new 
market conditions, while other production sites were shut down. Oil ex-
traction activities in the North Sea were instrumental in the consolidation 
of new markets, and here state regulation of market access played a major 
role in protecting the interests of domestic firms. In the third phase, from 
around 1990, Norwegian yards were again exposed to intensified interna-
tional competition. In this period, a process of rapid capital concentration 
changed the power relations in the industry.
Of course, changes in the capital structure and the way capital 
operates in the industry also took place in the earlier periods. Initially, 
4 Statistical yearbook 1952 and Strukturstatistikk for industri og bergverksdrift 
2017, Statistics Norway: https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/08597/tableView-
Layout1/
5 Heiret (2012).
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shipbuilding and ship repair in Norway were generally conducted by pro-
duction sites run by independent firms. But by the 1950s an industrial 
group was formed, as the Oslo firm Akers Mekaniske Verksted acquired 
other yards as subsidiaries geared to the mother firm’s production pro-
gram. Over the years this group grew and became dominant in the sector. 
The analysis of this process will therefore successively follow two paths: 
the development of the branch as a (statistical) whole; and the develop-
ment of a core element, the industrial groups, and in particular, the Aker 
Group, which was the most important.
The source material we use are of two types. First, statistical 
sources on the development of shipbuilding take the official figures from 
Statistics Norway as a starting point and are supplemented by surveys 
undertaken by public commissions. Further, materials from the Branch 
Council for the Shipbuilding Industry is used to cover the assessments and 
political initiatives of political and industry leaders. Secondly, the analysis 
of the Aker Group and its Stord yard builds on extensive personal and 
colleagues’ work, and especially on our participation in a recent project to 
write the history of the yard that drew on an extensive use of interviews 
with the yard’s workers’ representatives, managers and engineers.6 This 
material is basic to our understanding of developments during the last 
decades.
We first outline the significance of shipbuilding in the industrial 
structure in the first phase, pointing out its economic and organisational 
role in industrial life. Thereafter, we briefly discuss the branch’s relations 
to the state: What interest did the government have in this sector, and what 
impact did the sector have in the political system? The rest of the article 
discusses the fate of the branch in the three periods: The expansion phase 
1945-1975, the restructuration phase between 1975 and the 1990s, and 
finally the adaptation to more globalised competition from the 1990s. 
2. Shipbuilding’s place in the industrial structure
Industry was the dynamic force that led economic growth in Nor-
way after 1945. The industrial sector as a whole accounted for nearly 
one third of the country’s work force between 1945 and the 1970s. The 
industrial structure comprised different branches based on production of 
6 See the source overview for more detail.
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raw materials and semi-manufactured products, like iron and copper ore, 
chemicals and metals, pulp and paper. The consumer goods industries 
were also important, even if production of textiles, clothes and shoes was 
diminishing with the development of free trade agreements in the 1960s. 
Especially central to the industrial structure was the engineering industry, 
producing machinery, steel structures,   and other mechanical equipment, 
including steel ships. In the years around 1950, about 30 % of the indus-
trial labour force belonged to this branch. About 7 % of all workers were 
employed in building and repair of steel ships. In addition to those directly 
employed in shipbuilding, maybe as many as fifty percent more working 
in other branches were producing equipment for the yards in 1972.7 And 
in the following years, until its culmination in the 1970s, shipbuilding’s 
share of the work force was increasing (Table 1).
Compared to other shipbuilding nations, the branch in Norway 
has been characterized by a very low degree of concentration, with a 
large number of firms, most of them small and located all around the 
long coast. Official statistics reflect this structure: in 1972 there were 
194 registered firms in 1972 employing 30,352 workers, with an aver-
age of 63, 6 workers per firm. These figures hide the diversification of 
the sector. The largest 16 yards (with over 500 employees) employed 63 
percent of the total workforce. 61 yards that employed over 50 workers 
accounted for 87 percent of the total work force. This means that the 
remaining 133 units were very small, with 28 employees on average. 
Thirty years earlier, the situation was not very different: 71 percent of 
the work force worked in the 18 largest yards, which each employed 
almost 500 workers, while the rest of the yards employed on average 34 
each.8 The historical background for the many small-scale firms may be 
found in the class structure of rural Norway, where many people lived 
off fishing from their own boats, representing a  market for local firms in 
building and repairing the small vessels and their motors. In the 1950s, 
many of these firms started to build boats in steel instead of wood and 
were able to build vessels for local passenger routes and other means of 
coastal sea transport. Later on some of them also took a further step into 
the medium-sized category.
7 NOU (1974, 361) gives an estimate of 10-15000 persons working in other sec-
tors.
8 Aamundsen (1941, 18f.), see table 2.
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The large and medium-sized yards originated from another so-
cial context. They were usually situated in the larger coastal towns. These 
firms were established for building and repairing the ships of the urban 
shipping firms managing the merchant fleet sailing in international waters. 
It is these yards that interest us here. They have been central to the techni-
cal and economic development of the industry, and also the most influen-
tial in politics. The major shipyards were concentrated in the capital and 
the Oslofjord district. A 1941 survey of the 18 Norwegian yards building 
ships on a regular basis shows that 10 yards were situated in coastal towns 
in this heavily industrialized area. The Oslofjord district represented a 
concentration of large workplaces for metal workers and also for engi-
neers, with a common labour market and strong organizations catering for 
their social interests. The situation was not very different at the end of the 
growth period. In 1972, of the 16 yards with more than 500 workers each, 
11were situated in the same area, and were mostly the same ones as thirty 
years before.9 In addition, there were also some important yards with a 
relatively large work force on the west coast which played important roles 
during the growth period, and which from the 1970s became central in the 
transition to the production of offshore installations. It must be added that 
ownership was now more concentrated than these figures show, because 
of the formation of industrial groups (see below).
Since the 19th century, therefore, the basis for the large yards has 
been the merchant fleet, which has been important in Norways’ economic 
structure and one of the largest in the world. Its share of the world fleet’s 
tonnage was 6,9 % in 1939, and 8,2 % in 1973.10 This fleet contributed 
significantly to the gross national product, a circumstance of special im-
portance because it yielded vital foreign currency income for economic 
development during the early postwar years with restrictions on interna-
tional payments. The shipping industry was therefore politically influen-
tial. Shipping firms had strong relations to many shipbuilding firms. They 
were majority owners in many of them, and in so far as they placed orders 
for ships in Norway, had close contacts with yards on technical questions 
of ship design. 
All in all, shipbuilding was central to the economy for various 
reasons. First, the value of production and of the deliveries of material 
9 Aamundsen (1941, 18f); NOU (1973, 13).
10 NOU (1974, 16).
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and equipment from other firms were considerable. The engineering in-
dustry as a whole played a leading role in industrial development, by driv-
ing technological innovation and fabricating production equipment, but 
the shipbuilding firms in particular were regarded as “growth centres for 
competence”.11 Secondly, the branch represented employment for many 
people and was basic to the life of many local communities. It also repre-
sented an influential part of the organized interests in industry, its profes-
sional organizations being dominant in formulating employers’ strategies 
towards the state. The organized interests of shipbuilding firms, which 
were also in many questions in close cooperation with the ship owners, 
therefore weighed heavily in economic policy affairs. The same was the 
case for workers: metalworkers showed a high ratio of union membership, 
were central in formulating and fighting for the organized interests of the 
central trade union organization, and their most important strongholds 
were the large yards.
3. The role of the state
State intervention in the shipbuilding industry has played an 
important role in its whole post-war development. The organized in-
terests of the industry had their impact on the political regulations of 
the shipbuilding market in several ways. The unemployment crisis in 
the interwar years prompted unions’ claims for political remedies. The 
conditions of the shipbuilding industry engaged political authorities, es-
pecially after the social democratic party (DNA, literally the ‘Norwe-
gian Workers’ Party’) took over government in 1935, with a programme 
geared to use public resources to promote industrialization. One of the 
proposed projects engaging both industry’s leaders, metal workers’ or-
ganisations and the government, was a scheme to modernize and greatly 
expand production capacity in shipbuilding. In the following years, a 
programme to secure state support for investment in shipyards was ne-
gotiated. In the early post-war years, parliament granted state funding 
for investment in production facilities to some of the bigger yards. This 
was just a small part of the investments made in the period, but it sig-
nalled the state’s interest in the sector branch as an important one for the 
national economy.
11 NOU (1974, 362).
Anuario CEEED - Nº 12 - Año 11 - ISSN 2545-8299322
Jan Heiret y Hans-Jakob Ågotnes
The situation after the war posed special problems for a govern-
ment that had as its primary task to rebuild the economy after five years of 
German occupation. Necessary materials were scarce, and foreign curren-
cy remittances were restricted in order to give priority to some imported 
goods. The opportunity to order ships abroad was strictly regulated. As 
most shipping countries needed to rebuild their own commercial fleets, 
their yards were busy with domestic orders. Therefore, if Norwegians 
shipping firms could not raise capital and get contracts with yards abroad, 
they had to order new ships at home. Furthermore, during the 1948-1951 
years the government prohibited contracting ships outside Norway. The 
situation opened market opportunities which resulted in investments in 
Norwegian shipyards. During the 1960s, international trade was gradu-
ally liberalized, and the protection of shipbuilding was reduced. But ac-
tive government participation in the affairs of the industry continued by 
means of the “Branch Council for the Shipbuilding Industry”, established 
in 194712. Originally, the branch councils were conceived (at least by the 
unions) as vehicles for socialization of industry. Yard managers, therefore, 
were reluctant to participate in them. But councils soon became an organ 
for cooperation between state, management and unions, and coordinated 
their vested interests in order to influence political decisions in favour of 
the industry. They discussed the market situation and made initiatives to 
further the industry’s competitive power. An important issue during the 
1960s was the question of subsidies. With the cheap credit lines Japanese 
yards offered to ship owners in mind, the council recommended govern-
ment subsidies to allow Norwegian yards to obtain loans on similar con-
ditions. The government was attentive to such suggestions. In 1959 an 
institution with state participation for giving credit to the building of ships 
at Norwegian yards was established. Later, the state increased its support 
several times. When the crisis struck in the 1970s, the government inter-
vened more directly. First it prohibited extensions of the building capacity 
of the yards, and then planned reductions and switching production to 
new markets. Substantial public funds to support many companies secured 
their survival, in several cases made the transition to offshore production 
possible.
12 Excerpts from the annual reports of the Council of the shipbuilding industry 
are printed in Norsk Jern- og Metallarbeiderforbund. Beretning on forbundets 
virksomhet each year from 1947 to 1980.
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Of decisive importance for the fate of the yards after the oil crisis 
is also the so-called “Norweganization policy” in relation to the opening 
of oil extraction in the North Sea. After oil was discovered at the end of the 
1960s, the oil companies had to accept the condition to transfer compe-
tence in offshore operations to Norwegian firms. The state also established 
its own company, Statoil, in order to gradually take over operations of oil 
fields. Thus, it became possible for shipbuilding firms and the engineering 
industry more generally to develop advanced products for the oil industry 
and secure a strong position in the market. State support to enter this new 
market was probably a necessary condition for the industry to be able to 
make the transition.
4. The cycle of expansion 1945–1975
When the war ended, Norwegian shipbuilding could look back on 
25 years with a very bleak production record. None of the yards had been 
able to build ships to their full capacity. They had become less and less 
competitive, despite the fact that the country’s large fleet had expanded 
greatly in the same period. The yards might have a large home market; 
many of them were partly owned by or had otherwise close connections 
to shipping firms. Still, most new ships were built abroad. One reason 
for this is that shipping firms now preferred other ship types than before. 
The Norwegian commercial fleet of 1920 had consisted foremost of small 
steamships (70 % less than 4000 tdw), used in the trades between Euro-
pean harbours. In the interwar years, Norwegian firms were pressed out 
of these trades, and instead invested in ships geared to expand the busi-
ness of oil transportation. This meant transport between continents, where 
large tankers with diesel engines were the most cost effective.13 The ex-
pansion in tankers changed the composition of the fleet. In 1950 43,8 % 
of total tonnage were tankers, 62 % were over 6000 grt and 76 % were 
motor ships.14 This was a class of ships that most Norwegian yards had 
not been technically capable of building. Only one yard, the Akers Me-
kaniske Verksted in Oslo, had a licence to build ship diesel engines. Also 
13 Aamundsen (1941, 12); Kuuse (1983, 75f).
14 Historisk statistikk (1994) tab. 20.7: Number and tonnage of vessels and tab. 
20.10: The merchant fleet by the size of ships. https://www.ssb.no/a/histstat/nos/
nos_c188.pdf. 
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yard firms were unable to attract the necessary capital to modernize their 
production facilities.
The fact that most of the ships ordered by Norwegian shipown-
ers were built abroad contributed to the formation of a world market for 
new ships. Together with other countries with a large fleet and virtual-
ly no shipbuilding industry, like Greece, Norwegian demand represented 
an international market open for global competition.15 Other European 
yards delivered most of the new Norwegian ships in the immediate post-
war years, above all Sweden. But soon Japan entered the market and took 
a large share. The first orders from Norway, two whaling vessels, were 
placed in 1948.16 Eventually, Japan’s growing competitiveness made the 
cou try the largest supplier, especially of tankers.
In this global market, the question was whether yards would be 
able to build larger ships. Technological developments favoured ships 
with high loading capacity which were cheaper to manage (e.g., by small-
er crew, better fuel economy and shorter time in port for loading and un-
loading). As a result, new ships were more cost effective than slightly old-
er ships, and this drove the renewal of fleets. Japanese yards were pioneers 
in new ships’ design.17 These trends meant that, in order to be awarded 
contracts, yards had more or less permanently to invest in expanded pro-
duction facilities. 
Other areas where the Japanese were competitive, were short 
delivery times and low prices. Both demanded a continuous rationaliza-
tion in the organisation of work, especially in production. Short delivery 
periods also put a premium on the size of the yard: with many workers 
employed, the task would of course be finished in less time. Therefore, 
countries with a high degree of capital concentration in the sector, like 
Japan and Sweden, had an advantage over the Norwegian yard industry.18 
The cost of a ship, on the other hand, depended on how much work was 
necessary to build it. Yards measured their effectiveness by the amount of 
steel processed per work hour. Cost effectiveness was in practice handled 
by schemes to reduce the amount of work laid down in the product.
15 Olsson (1983, 125ff., 189).
16 Chida & Davis (1990, 83).
17 Chida & Davis (1990, 117).
18 In Sweden, six yards represented 85-90 % of the purchased materials (and 
thereby of production); Kuuse (1983, 7).
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During the 1940s, a general conviction emerged among Norwe-
gian yard leaders that it would be possible to regain a share in the ship-
building market. Given the extraordinary demand for tonnage because of 
war losses, and the restrictions on international payments, they anticipated 
favourable conditions for domestic production. All large or middle-sized 
firms made plans to catch up with their foreign competitors. The first de-
cade after 1945 was used to rebuild berths and workshops on an extended 
scale in order to build large ships. But they had to be able to build ships 
at competitive prices. Here, it was obvious to yard leaders that the pro-
duction system used in war production in the USA must lay at the basis 
for their plans for the future. It included block building of the hulls and 
welding together of the parts, an innovation that was also implemented in 
other shipbuilding countries. Block building would make production more 
flexible, facilitating prefabrication of parts and the assembly of sections 
of the hulls in assembly halls. This way, several sections could be built in 
parallel before they were mounted on the berth. In the existing practice, 
each steel profile and plate were assembled on the berth after the previous 
one had been put in place.19 The new methods promised to reduce the 
work hours necessary to build a hull, and to make the building process 
more effective, a potential that was gradually exploited during the follow-
ing decades.
The implementation of the new production system was a major 
transformation that took several years and demanded heavy investments. 
Larger building berths were re-arranged to build large hulls, but market 
conditions made it hard for the firms to realize their extended capacity 
potential. For example, since 1920 Rosenberg Mekaniske Verksted, one 
of the big yards on the west coast, had been technically able to build ships 
up to 20 000 tdw. But virtually no new ships had been built before the war, 
and the vessels  actually built in the late 1940s were much smaller. The 
yard invested in new facilities every year since 1945, but it was not until 
1950 that it was able to build the first large ship (though because of low 
productivity the economic result of this project was meagre).20 Thereafter, 
until the late 1960s, when Aker took the lead, the yard consistently deliv-
ered the largest ships built in Norway. Some of the remaining yards were 
19 For a thorough analysis, see Andersen (1986).
20 Nerheim & al. (1995, 202f).
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slower to implement the change.21 But by the mid-1950s most yards had 
completed the transition.
During the 1950s, then, the Norwegian yards were transformed 
on the basis of the new production system, block building and welding. 
At the end of the decade, the total building capacity had risen to 300 000 
– 350 000 grt per year, twice as much as before the war. What was actu-
ally built was less, but finished tonnage quadrupled between 1951 and 
1961.22 A symptom of the growing competitive strength of the domestic 
industry was that during since 1950 total tonnage delivered to Norwe-
gian shipping firms   grew from 9 to 30 % or total deliveries. Whereas in 
1961 actual size of ordered  ships ranged from of 60000 to -75000 grt, ten 
years before the largest ship that Norwegian yards were able to build was 
12000 grt.23 A precondition for this success was renewed investments in 
facilities in order to build the larger ships that were in high demand. In the 
years round 1960, several large yards constructed building docks, a major 
innovation compared to the traditional berths. Efforts to work more effi-
ciently became a permanent part of the work organisation. The first phase 
of rationalizations, introducing block building and welding, was followed 
by “sustained efforts” to “modernize and rationalize” production. Invest-
ments in lifting equipment with higher capacity made it possible to pre-
fabricate ever larger blocks. More efficient equipment for marking and 
cutting was introduced. First and foremost, changes in the organization 
of work were implemented; as from the early 1960s, the importance of 
planning was especially stressed. The firms benefited from innovations in 
other countries, through delegations visiting foreign yards, and through 
the work of research institutions. The Council of the shipbuilding industry 
argued that intensified research in Norwegian institutions was important 
in order to “achieve optimal benefits from international research results”.24
21 Magdal (1993, 283).
22 Excerpts from the annual report of the Council of the shipbuilding industry, 
in Norsk Jern- og Metallarbeiderforbund. Beretning on forbundets virksomhet 
(1959, 87). For pre-war capacity: Aamundsen (1941, 19). In 1959 244500 grt 
were delivered from Norwegian yards. Excerpts… (1959).
23 Excerpts from the annual report of the Council of the shipbuilding industry, 
in Norsk Jern- og Metallarbeiderforbund. Beretning om forbundets virksomhet 
(1961, 244).
24 Excerpts (1969, 113).
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In the period 1960-1975, the capacity of the major yards was fur-
ther augmented by investments in docks and workshops. Employment grew, 
too, but at a modest pace. Measured by the amount of steel processed per 
worker, productivity was increasing rapidly (admittedly, partly an effect of 
the increasing ship sizes). But despite all the investments and the increased 
production, profitability was not the best. The yards complained year after 
year that they had to sign contracts at a loss. The Council of the industry 
identified the cause in global overproduction, which depressed prices. First 
towards the end of the 1960s this situation changed. In 1969 the branch was 
booming. Now the yards could at last produce at full capacity.
The development of the Norwegian yards since the war, their 
modernization and constant rationalization of production and their ability 
to build more and more advanced products, had made them more similar 
to the industry in other countries. Several Norwegian yards increased the 
size of the ships they built at more or less the same pace in this peri-
od, competing in building ever larger tankers. They were part of a global 
production system characterized by a logic of development common to 
the competing yards. An important difference, however, was the size of 
workplaces. The large Norwegian yards were small in international com-
parison. The decentralized structure of the industry gave Norwegian firms 
a disadvantage compared to the big Swedish and Japanese, with their large 
capital bases and high production volumes.
Then in the 1950s, a concentration process started in Norwegian 
shipbuilding. Akers Mekaniske Verksted (AMV), adopted a strategy to 
spread production on different units by combining several yards in the 
production process. This firm had the advantage of being the only one in 
the country licenced to build ship diesel engines when the war ended.25 
It also had one of the biggest shipping firms as its owner. The yard was 
situated in the capital, without enough space to build large ships.  Aker’s 
strategy to solve this problem was to acquire other yards outside the city 
in order to build the large hulls, which would then be moved to the capital 
to be outfitted. In 1956, the Oslo firm bought a small yard on the western 
coast, establishing Stord Verft, where heavy investments were made. A 
building dock with capacity to build hulls of 65000 tdw. was finished in 
1958, and after a few years extended to 100000 tons.26
25 Two other yards soon acquired such licences, but the rest continued to rely on 
outside suppliers of diesel engines.
26 Grove & Heiret (1996, 100).
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By acquiring majority shares in other yards, AMV established 
the first real multi-unit group in Norwegian shipbuilding. The number of 
subordinated units grew; ten years after the first acquisition another large 
firm was bought, Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder. Now AMV controlled 
five units, and had the option to integrate their building programmes in its 
overall strategy. In particular, several units around the coast built sections 
of hulls that were then towed to Stord to be assembled, and thereafter 
the hull was towed to Oslo to be equipped. This strategy enabled AMV 
to build supertankers of ever larger size, the only firm to enter the most 
keen struggle to secure orders for the largest tankers. While the largest 
ship built in Stord until 1959 was 6000 grt, in the 1960s the tonnage grew 
from 20000 grt to 110000, and in 1975 to 140000.27 In the early  1970s it 
was by far the most important shipbuilder in the country, representing 28 
% of employment in the larger firms in the industry. By that time the con-
centration of ownership had resulted in the formation of five other groups 
controlling several production units. The six groups together controlled 44 
% of employment in the large firms.28
5. Production system and industrial relations
The imperatives of competition in the international market result-
ed in the investments in production facilities and rationalization of the 
yard organizations during the expansion phase. But it remained to realize 
the potential for productivity gains that lay in the production system and in 
the ability to build the types of ships with the fastest increase in demand. 
The actual performance of production depended on the people doing the 
work. The specific form of relations in the workplace, between managers, 
foremen and workers, must therefore be considered as a factor in defining 
the efficiency of the production process.
Shipbuilding based on block building poses demands on the or-
ganisation of the production process; coordination  of tasks, workers  and 
material in order to secure a cost effective process. As the production 
system has potential for ever more cost-cutting, it tends to become more 
complicated over time. During the growth phase, the role of the engi-
27 Myklebust (1994, 207f). Figures in dwt converted to grt: https://www.sjohisto-
rie.no/no/skip. 
28 NOU (1973, 19).
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neers became more important. Both the technical work, the theoretical 
construction of the ships, and the planning of production became more 
complex. The ratio of engineers to workers thereby increased.29 This ratio 
expresses a changing balance between the two groups in the production 
process: More and more decisions were taken as part of the design of the 
ships. From early in the 1950s, optical marking was introduced, i.e., the 
form of the steel plates was transferred directly from the drawings to the 
plates. The next step was to let burning machines automatically cut the 
steel guided by the optically transferred drawings, and eventually numer-
ical drawing and burning machines were developed which could transfer 
the design of the parts on the basis of information fed from the designers’ 
calculations.
A core competence of the skilled plate workers was thereby trans-
ferred to the engineering departments. Simultaneously, planning and con-
trolling the building process tended to become more central to economiz-
ing production, another factor strengthening the role of the engineers. As 
already mentioned, the key factor in monitoring cost effectiveness was the 
throughput of steel per work hour, and workers being idle because they 
lacked the means to do their task meant increased costs. The rationaliza-
tion of the work process seemingly did not generate conflict with those 
working in production. The skilled production workers were in favour of 
measures that made the process more cost effective. To understand why, 
we need to consider the relations that characterized the work ethos in this 
industry.
A basic condition for profitable production, as well as for the living 
standards of workers, is the way the firms’ relations to their work force is 
regulated. The system of labour relations which had developed during the 
first decades of the 20th Century was founded on the principle of negotiations 
between nation-wide labour market organisations and on the active partic-
ipation by the state in regulating the negotiating procedures. Agreements 
covering the whole country were signed for periods of two or three years 
during which strikes were prohibited. In case negotiations ended in conflict, 
the government could intervene by dictating a new agreement. During the 
first period after the war, on several occasions the general wage tariffs were 
fixed by the state in this way. The government wanted to limit growth in 
wage levels in order to prioritize investments. In this way, industrial peace 
29 For the following, see Ågotnes & Heiret (2017).
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was generally secured. Metalworkers had, from the beginning of the 20th 
Century, been able to formalize certain principles that ruled their relations 
both at industry level and with management in the workplace. A formalized 
agreement at national level whereby the minimum wage level was central 
secured these principles. They had been fighting hard to get these principles 
codified and to defend them during the inter-war years. An effect of the 
process was a strong union organisation with members highly conscious of 
their common interests, a trait that characterized the organisation into the 
postwar period, especially in larger workplaces with pre-war traditions.
In everyday experience, industrial relations are above all enacted 
at workplace level. In the engineering industry, wages were dependent on 
piece rates negotiated between foremen and work teams in the individual 
workplaces. Metal workers’ real wages were therefore a question of what 
they could earn from piece work. Workers expected to earn considerably 
more than their hourly wage when they did piece work – 50 % more was 
often presupposed as ordinary. Despite all day-to-day haggling with fore-
men over the setting of piece rates, this system (which of course was in 
general use in most shipbuilding countries), was also an expression of a 
social relation embedded in the practice of production. It expressed work-
ers’ expectations about the just payment for a given job, and a moral claim 
that the firm should accept rates conforming to these expectations.
As a result, they experienced the interest conflict with manage-
ment on a day-to-day basis, especially in connection with firms’ efforts to 
gain control over wage development through time measurement and work 
studies which were generally introduced in the yards after 1945. Together 
with the bargaining process at national level, the piece rate system gave 
concrete form to the Norwegian class relations in this branch of industry.
During the 1950s, the piece rate system was the most important 
mechanism by which metalworkers could gain increases in their real in-
come.  During this period the central bargaining fixing hourly wages was 
tightly controlled by the government, which prioritized investment, espe-
cially in industry, in order to increase national economic growth. Workers 
would expect that their earnings would reflect the economic results of 
their firm. They just found that the gains achieved through productivity 
increases should be shared between the firm and themselves. As long as 
this condition was fulfilled, they were in favour of the piece rate system, 
which they viewed as the mechanism that could give them their share of 
the values produced.
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They also conceived the principle of open negotiations as a basic 
right: Piece rates should be freely negotiated. If the firm did not respect 
that, e.g. by setting the rates on the basis of time measurement of the work 
operations, it would mean conflict.30 The expectations that they had a le-
gitimate right to share the value added in production with the firm seems 
to be foundational in the working ethos of the metal workers of the peri-
od. The workers of the large yards, the strongholds of the metalworkers’ 
union, played a central role in enforcing the ideal in real life.
The ideal was alive not least in the Aker Group, where relations 
between management and the production workers developed in a special 
way. In the 1950s, management in the Oslo Yard found that the piece rate 
system had become a hindrance for further productivity gains. If the over-
all coordination of production was becoming more important for produc-
tivity than the work pace of each worker or work team, another form of 
motivation would be appropriate. The local union leader was also interest-
ed in a change. He was a determined adherent of cooperation on produc-
tivity as a way to a better life for workers. In 1957 the parties in the yard 
agreed to introduce a fixed salary combined with an agreement that the 
workers should contribute to increase productivity, and that actual increas-
es would result in wage increases through local negotiations.31 The system 
spread to the other units in the group, and later to the rest of the yards and 
other parts of the metal industry.
The new wage system introduced important changes in the rela-
tions in the workplace. It tended to shift workers’ focus from their indi-
vidual piece rated jobs to the smooth progress of the overall production. 
Organized worked elected special shop stewards responsible for produc-
tivity work, and a regular and intimate cooperation on cost reductions was 
established. Regardless of the concrete productivity results, it contribut-
ed to establish an atmosphere of mutual understanding with management 
which, at least in the case of the Stord unit, has continued since. Of course, 
a presupposition for this cooperation is that union members feel that they 
are handled justly when it comes to wage and other working conditions, 
30 Cf. Svensson (1983, 273f.) about similar relations in Sweden: Workers in the 
Gothenburg yards were in favour of piece rates and time measurement as method 
to fix piece rates, precisely because it made it possible to influence their own 
income.
31 Grove & Heiret (1995, 87).
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and that negotiations are really open. Now higher productivity was sup-
posed to result in wage increases for all workers through local bargaining 
once a year. In principle, the fixed wage system was just another mecha-
nism to secure the tacit agreement that production gains ought to be split 
between all parties.  Thus it secured the “wage drift” that earlier had been 
a result of working to piece rates. During the period up to the 1970s this 
vehicle for wage increase contributed to maintain the fundamental class 
compromise that, with few exceptions, secured industrial peace.
How successful?
Looking back, the effort of the industry during the growth phase 
was a success: the yards were able to expand their market share and great-
ly expand production. According to official statistics, in 1975 output in 
shipbuilding passed one million grt, and employment reached a maximum 
with over 31000 workers. This work force did not only build and repair 
ships. That year only about 60 % of capacity was used to build the usu-
al ship types; it was assessed that 6500-7000 employed were occupied 
with deliveries for the oil sector (this figure includes building of supply 
ships).32 The impact on the branch of the oil extraction in the North Sea 
had already become visible.
Like in other countries, Norwegian yards suffered from depressed 
prices during most of the 1960s due to international overproduction inter-
nationally. But, like in most other countries, they benefited from state sub-
sidized credit like yards. However, they probably never achieved the same 
cost efficiency rates of global market leaders in this industry.33 In addition, 
the size of Norwegian yards meant that they did not have big financial 
muscles. Most of them could not have operated with the same profitabil-
ity of large yards in Sweden or Japan, which were still the most import-
ant competitors up to the yard crisis.34 Those yards have been described 
as “ship factories”, that is specialized enterprises that built similar ships 
32 Norsk Jern- og metallarbeiderforbund (1975, 50).
33 See Svensson (1983, 291), table 36, with figures for produced grt per employed 
in different countries – not an accurate measure, but it may be an indication. It 
shows Norway lagging behind Japan and especially Sweden.
34 NOU (1974, 13).
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in series.35 Their profitability presupposed a high volume of production, 
high throughput speed and production at the yard’s full capacity. Norwe-
gian yards did not achieve this ideal. But they were more flexible, usually 
building ships of different types and sizes. This flexibility was probably 
part of the explanation for their survival. Meanwhile, Swedish yards did 
not recover after the shipping crisis. Maybe they were less productive, but 
they were not as dependent on one segment in the market.
It is reasonable to conclude that yards in general were to a certain 
degree able to compete during the growth period on the basis of productiv-
ity. They adopted globally-developed methods, and managed to cut work 
hours in order to stay in business. The positive attitude of the employ-
ees towards productivity work must have contributed significantly to this. 
Even so, they needed the active support of the state, through both protec-
tive measures in the initial phase and subsidized credit later.
6. Crisis and reorganization on the basis of new markets, 1975–1990s
The shipping crisis of the mid 1970s had deep effects on the ship-
building industry globally. The OECD considered a 40 % reduction in 
the world’s shipbuilding capacity necessary, the Norwegian government 
accepted this recommendation, and foresaw a reduction of the shipbuild-
ing work force of 6000 posts.36 The Shipbuilding committee appointed by 
the Norwegian Ministry of Industry in 1976 proposed a plan to reach this 
goal, which implied a reduction in employment, but also aimed to help 
part of the industry to establish itself in new markets. The government was 
determined to take control over the adaptation process that it saw as nec-
essary, rather than leave to the individual firms to tackle the effects. The 
yards could no longer obtain export orders because the European coun-
tries that until recently had placed orders in Norway now had established 
support schemes to protect their own yards.37 The government met the 
situation by subsidising shipbuilding contracts of firms which under the 
new circumstances could not compete on price. Others got support for 
investments necessary to alter their production. In addition, government 
funding was used to help shipping firms through their liquidity crises. The 
35 Svensson (1983, 291ff).
36 NOU (1978, 6f).
37 NOU (1978, 6).
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measures were seen as anti-cyclical, and therefore as aid for a limited pe-
riod. The ministries intervened directly in the industry to reach its goals, 
to lead the firms through the crisis and avoid high unemployment rates.38 
The crisis hit the Aker Group particularly hard. When the boom 
ended in 1974, Aker received cancellations of supertankers totalling 2,3 
million dwt for ships that should have been built at the Stord unit.39  Aker, 
the company building the largest ships ever built in Norway, had followed 
a dangerous strategy in order to achieve its position. The supertankers 
built at Stord were ordered by shipping firms operating on the spot market 
for oil loads. This way, they earned very high profits on oil freights in 
boom periods. Ship-owners who made long-term freight contracts could 
build their supertankers at Japanese yards at lower prices than Aker was 
able to offer, at least partly due to Japanese cheap credit. But the Japa-
nese demanded long-term freight contracts as security vis-a-vis the yard. 
Speculative shipping firms, therefore, could not get their tankers built in 
Japan. Aker, on the other hand, was not able to match Japanese terms and 
had to do business with the speculative firms at a high risk in order to 
get contracts. These shipping firms were the first to lose freight contracts 
when the market slumped, while those with long-term freight agreements 
were still in business.
What saved the Aker Group and the Stord yard in particular was 
orders for the oil industry. A group of engineers in Aker had started to 
develop designs for the oil industry. This work resulted in large produc-
tion of a type of drilling rig that was a success in the market and was also 
licensed to yards in other countries. The group had recently established 
a yard specialized in building these rigs, Aker Verdal. When the crisis 
struck, Aker had also secured the order for the steel deck for a permanent 
installation in the sea. The establishment in this market made firm surviv-
al possible. The building of the platform deck was transferred to Stord. 
Aker abandoned ship-building and geared all  efforts to products for the 
oil sector concentrated to the two yards, Stord and Verdal. The other firms 
were sold.
The rapid migration to new markets made it possible for Aker 
to survive, but it was still heavily dependent on state support. For years 
after the transformation, Aker was in financial trouble because of losses 
38 NOU (1978, 6).
39 Mjelva (2005, 110).
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originating in cancelled ship projects. In the case of the Aker Group, the 
state engaged in direct negotiations to keep the firm in business. The re-
sult was that the largest cement producer in Norway gained control over 
Aker, which thereby no longer was a dedicated yard firm, but became a 
conglomerate of branches (yards, building materials, construction). As a 
diversified industrial group, it was still one of the largest industrial firms 
in Norway. 
The following period saw major changes in the structure of the 
industry.  In 2000 the number of people employed in building ships was 
reduced to 25 % of those employed in 1975, according to official statis-
tics. It was a historical coincidence that the offshore oil production was 
expanding during the crisis, but as a result Norwegian industry was better 
off than its counterparts in many other countries. The production of deliv-
erances to the oil industry absorbed most of the work force. Protectionist 
measures helped to secure work for domestic firms. But only some of the 
yards benefited from the new market. Therefore, the crisis effected a ma-
jor restructuration and relocalization of the branch. Almost all the major 
yards in the Oslofjord area were closed down during the 1980s. Here, only 
small firms remained in the old yard areas. Employment shifted to the 
west coast, where the large firms now produced oil platforms or modules 
for platforms, while a number of small yards were building special vessels 
for the oil industry. The western region had around  25000 workers em-
ployed in 1975, a figure that was unchanged in 2000, with a reduction to 
ca. 20000 in 2005. Almost all of them were engaged in building and repair 
of ships in 1975, but only 7500 in 2005.40 The ships built in Norway once 
again consisted of small ships.41 Supply ships, for offshore activities, was 
one important type. This new market provided the basis for the expansion 
of the relatively small firms of the northwestern region. These technically 
advanced and expensive vessels represented high production values. They 
also demanded other professional skills, and offered opportunities to gain 
a higher profit than what was possible with ship types like the tankers, 
where the steel work was the main ingredient.
The growing importance of engineering, especially after the tran-
sition to production for the offshore sector, meant that large technical mi-
lieus were created. They were organized as daughter firms inside the Aker 
40 Bore & Skoglund (2008, 88).
41 NOU (1978, 14).
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and Kvaerner Groups, and worked on ship and rig design and other tasks. 
Eventually, the different engineering milieus in Aker were merged to Aker 
Engineering, and from 1975 this major collection of professional skills 
was directed towards production for the oil sector.
Other firms tried to meet competition and changing structure of 
demand by specializing their production towards special tonnage. One 
class was chemical tankers, and another were tankers for transport of liq-
uefied natural gas (LNG). A leading group in the engineering industry, 
Kvaerner, specialized in LNG tankers after it acquired a small yard where 
the engineers developed the technology, and thereafter bought the large 
Rosenberg yard in order to build larger LNG tankers.42 They had formed 
Moss Rosenberg Verft, a group inside Kvaerner, in 1969.43 The group ex-
ploited the LNG technology and thereby secured its leading position in 
a niche in the shipbuilding market. It was later to become Aker’s most 
important Norwegian competitor.
The former Aker units lived on for some years as parts of differ-
ent constellations. Bergens Mekaniske Verksteder (BMV) is an interesting 
case. This firm, originally one of the more important and a small local 
group in itself before it became part of the Aker Group, was now acquired 
by a newly successful group consisting of small yards of the north west, 
the Ulstein Group. Ulstein had gained strength during the 60s and 70s by 
building small, but advanced vessels for the fishing fleet and after 1970 
especially supply ships for the offshore business. The attraction of BMV 
was its successful production of diesel engines for auxiliary machinery. 
Ulstein soon sold out the shipbuilding department, keeping the motor and 
reparation departments. The shipbuilding department was taken over by 
local capital and later by the employees, and the new firm succeeded in 
getting shipbuilding orders for some time. It eventually delivered the larg-
est ship ever built there before it was closed down in 1991.
The reparation department was also sold after some years, maybe 
as a result of diverging views on how the unit should be managed. Inter-
nal relations in many of the smaller yards in rural areas were different 
from the ones where the union traditions were more rooted. The way new 
managers conducted leadership met with distrust in the yard organization. 
It was sold to another, still smaller, local yard. Eventually, after 2000, it 
42 Nerheim & al. (1995, 296ff).
43 Nerheim & al. (1995, 300).
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became the core of a new group, Bergen Group, which rapidly gained 
control of several yards both in Norway and abroad (including Rosen-
berg) and at most employed more than 2000 persons, before being reduced 
again to a small local player. In the meantime, the yard had built several 
small, advanced ships for seismic investigation of the sea bed.
The fate of BMV is indicative of a different reality facing the 
branch after the yard crisis. The end of stable ownership coincided with 
the end of relatively stable markets. There was also a general trend to-
wards mergers in economic life starting in the 1980s. The build-up of the 
Aker Group in the 50s and 60s had been founded on a strictly industrial 
strategy, where firms were bought in order to increase production capac-
ity geared to making a specific product. Now, firms were often bought in 
order to expand the scale of operations, without regard to their type of 
production. Production units were at times bought and sold again within a 
short period of time. 
What were the consequences for the relations within the industry? 
With regard to the labour relations at national level, no substantial changes 
were made to the formal system. The central levels of the industrial rela-
tions system were maintained.  As before, wage agreements for the whole 
metal industry were decided between the main organisations. At this level, 
the state might still influence the level of wages, but less directly than ear-
lier. Government recommend moderate claims and sought to influence the 
negotiating parties by pointing to consequences for the economy of higher 
wage levels. Like in the past, it could also intervene more directly in the 
bargaining process.
A “test” of the union members’ attitudes to the industrial relations 
system was carried out around 1980. In an effort to limit wage increases, 
including the local wage drift, the government proclaimed a “wage stop” 
after the central bargaining process ended without agreement in 1978. The 
measure made wage increases illegal for the next one anda half years. This 
measure provoked a protest movement among the union members in the 
metal industry, led by the workers in the large yards.  Workers considered 
that, on the one hand, there had been a breach of the principle of the right 
to free negotiations (“the bargaining right”); and that, on the other hand, 
the state prevented them from earning their fair share of produced value 
in the industry. The mobilisation had repercussion on the bargaining pro-
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cesses in following years, during which yard workers took the leadership 
again. But after 1986 its energy faded out.44
Despite the activism of the local unions, the conditions for the 
wage struggle had changed.  Yards competing for orders of decks for the 
production platforms met hard competition. A big order like this could 
keep the work force occupied for several years. Aker Stord built the first 
deck for a major field in the North Sea delivered by a Norwegian firm, and 
took it for granted that they would also get the next. When they lost the 
order to its competitor, Rosenberg, it was experienced as a major setback 
that sparked a cost-cutting process in the aftermath. In spite of the vast 
investments in oil extraction, the yards building big offshore installations 
had to honour offers at the lowest possible price in order to be in business. 
The oil companies that were in charge of operating the fields, the state 
company Statoil included, had more or less monopoly power in relation to 
yard firms which competed fiercely among themselves. The unions had to 
consider the situation of the own firm before they claimed wage increases.
In the growth phase, the effort of the trade unions had centred 
around securing for their members a share of the increasing production in 
the form of growth in real wages, shorter work hours, extended vacations, 
and a better work environment. After the yard crisis, conditions for trade 
union activity changed. Local unions engaged more than before in their 
firm’s struggle to secure orders and stay in business. They might have to 
renounce on wage claims in order to ascertain that the yard got orders. 
They also struggled to keep down the number of temporary workers, se-
curing work for as many permanent employees as possible. The problem 
of recruitment of workers had been aggravated by the opening of oil ex-
traction in the North Sea. Due to their high wage level, offshore activities 
attracted skilled metalworkers. Plate workers and welders in particular 
were in high demand.45 Many of them were recruited from the yards. On 
the other hand, yards’ manpower needs became more variable. In order to 
keep building schedules, it became necessary to hire temporary workers 
for shorter periods. Manpower firms emerged, and a part of the workforce 
became more mobile. The ratio of temporary to permanent workers in 
large yards reached 7,5 % in 1976.46 It represented both a problem for the 
44 Ågotnes & Heiret (2017).
45 Norsk Jern- og metallarbeiderforbund (1970, 200).
46 NOU (1978, 17).
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yards and its solution: The work force became less stable, but at the same 
time a market for temporary workers was created. Permanent workers re-
sented the practice, both because the temporarily employed had higher 
wages, and because they were outsiders and therefore less efficient work-
ers. After 2000 the recruitment of low-wage workers from the EU area 
was to pose a new problem for the local unions.
In this situation the horizon and field of action of workers’ rep-
resentatives widened, and industrial strategies became a central concern. 
It also meant that it became more important to be represented where im-
portant decisions were taken, that is in the board of the group, not only the 
local unit. The task of local union leaders became more complex. It was 
no longer only a question of defending the immediate working conditions 
of their members. They had to intervene in the management of the firm, 
design and apply strategies, enter into alliances with their leaders, and 
possibly with other players in the market. The content of the relations 
with management thereby changed. But the active support from the union 
representatives for the firms’ interests continued. The relation of trust and 
cooperation was still an important asset in the competitive struggle.
7. Capital concentration and intensified global competition, 
1990s-201947
The restructuration of the branch and its consolidation on the basis 
of new markets during the 1980s had resulted in an industry with a differ-
ent composition. The building of new ships was drastically reduced. Now, 
production of big installations for the oil sector accounted for most of the 
activity. The market structure in this sector is different from what was the 
case for shipbuilding: There are few buyers, quite often only one whose 
monopolist position allows it to press down prices when there are several 
yard firms competing to “win” the order (that is the expression used).
From around 1990 the effect of these market conditions was rein-
forced by changes in the political regulations of the sector.  State protec-
tionist measures that secured Norwegian firms a large share of the orders 
during the 1980s were reversed.  In 1993 a government initiative resulted 
in a project with the additional participation from the industry, and the 
oil companies in charge of oil fields which aimed at creating conditions 
47 For the following, see Byrkjeland & al. (2019).
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for more cost-efficient production. Common standards and contract forms 
were among the means. The new attitude of government authorities, en-
dorsed by the oil companies, was that the costs of installations in the North 
Sea should be harmonized with those of  oil fields in other regions of the 
world. The basic premise was that costs must be reduced with 40 %.
The political background for the decision to globalize the cost level 
of Norwegian producers was, among other factors, an ambition to make 
it easier for Norwegian oil companies to internationalize. The state-owned 
Statoil aspired to do business in other parts of the world. In 2001 parliament 
agreed to partially privatise it and invited private capital to join in on the 
premise that Statoil would no longer be an instrument for political interests, 
but was to operate strictly on the basis of the logic of the market. According 
to the neo-liberal ideas that had gained force in political parties, including 
among the social democrats, the best way to regulate business was through 
the market. Hence, protectionism of the initial phase of oil extraction was 
given up. The ambition of earlier governments to actively support specific 
industries as part of an industrial political strategy had long been out of the 
question. As a seal of this political trend, in 1994 Norway joined the Euro-
pean Economic Area agreement with the European Union, which in practice 
made the country part of the common European market.
The marked shift in economic policy was not only an effect of a 
new ideology gaining foothold in politics. It was also a question of market 
strategies. In the early 1990s, it was a common opinion in the sector that 
the oil production in Norway had reached its peak, and that the oil compa-
nies had to find other areas in order to maintain their income. The oil price 
had also been low since the middle of the 1980s, making smaller reser-
voirs in the North Sea unprofitable to exploit. That implied fewer orders 
for the yards, and thereby harder competition between them
As a result of the intensified pressure to reduce their cost level, the 
yards producing for the offshore sector worked hard to reform their organi-
zations and rationalize production processes. In Aker Stord, comprehensive 
rationalization projects were running during the rest of the decade. Special 
attention was paid to the coordination of the work of the engineers who 
delivered the design and specifications for the installations, and the people 
who actually constructed them. The ultimate purpose was to let both tasks 
influence each other – the needs of production should influence the way 
drawings were made. In this case the yard cooperated with another division 
of Aker, Aker Enginneering, which had grown to a substantial size.
Anuario CEEED - Nº 12 - Año 11 - ISSN 2545-8299 341
The shipbuilding industry in Norway and the rise of the Aker Group
The focus on rationalization in the shipbuilding period had been 
foremost on the physical production process – on the logistics of building 
hull and machinery. In offshore production, where engineering work rep-
resented a larger part of work hours, more attention was payed to ratio-
nalize their work. During the 1980s and 1990s, digital programmes were 
perfected to automatize many engineering operations, resulting in sub-
stantial reductions in the time needed to produce work drawings.  Other 
programmes were developed to monitor and coordinate the production 
process and to supervise and control the quality of work, e.g. welding 
seams. This way, much of the manual work of the engineers disappeared. 
On the other hand, the complexity of the products had greatly expanded. 
Engineers delivered much more detailed specifications, which lay at the 
basis of the production process, than had been the case for ships. The 
consequences were that a design that was difficult to build would have 
unforeseen costs. Therefore, cooperation in an early phase between those 
who did the basic form-giving and those who planned production was 
important to secure a cost-effective process.  Product planning in such a 
way was easier and had a great potential for productivity gains. Simulta-
neously, the potential in block building for more effective production was 
still important and motivated investments in production facilities – cranes 
with more lifting capacity, for example.
Around the turn of the millennium, there were major changes in 
ownership and corporate structure in the yard industry. Since the yard 
crisis, it had become normal that firms were bought and sold. Whereas 
so far the two giants in engineering and yard production, the Aker and 
Kvaerner groups, had bought other firms, they were now candidates to be 
bought. Kvaerner followed an aggressive strategy of buying firms, among 
them shipyards, at home and abroad, and by 1992 was the biggest ship-
builder in Europe.48 Aker was still big in oil construction, cement and the 
building industry, but the price of the company’s shares was low. In 1996 
an ousider investor bought a large share of the company, and eventually 
gained control of the whole group. The shift in ownership started a series 
of reorganizations of the industry. As the new unites were integrated, the 
takeover of a smaller group of offshore firms resulted in an internal reor-
ganization in Aker. Then, because Kvaerner was in financial trouble after 
such gigantic acquisitions, Aker took over Kvaerner in 2001. The large 
48 Osland (1992, 31).
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engineering departments of both firms were merged. Eventually, the parts 
producing for the oil sector became part of Aker Solutions, a subsidiary 
firm directed towards oil services at the global level in more than 30 coun-
tries. Finally, the yards producing the big offshore installations were split 
from Aker Solutions under the name Aker t. Aker thereby became the ab-
solutely dominant player in the offshore deliverance market.
Capital concentration in the branch implied that domestic com-
petition was considerably reduced. But the oil companies had the option 
to order abroad. When the financial crisis starting in 2008 hit the large 
yards in South Korea and Japan, it immediately affected the prices for oil 
installations. Large contracts were signed with yards in South Korea and 
Singapore. Aker is a relatively small firm compared to the large Asian 
companies, and is not well equipped to meet competition. The firm has 
managed to secure work after this setback, however, and as of 2019 Ak-
er’s yards still have orders to keep the work force busy. But the future is 
uncertain. Union representatives claim that their company’s strong asset 
is relations of close cooperation with management. They maintain that, 
despite a relatively high wage level, this is what makes the Norwegian 
yard worker competitive.
The new ownership in Aker and its takeover of Kvaerner also 
affected shipbuilding. The takeover in 1996 brought with it a group of 
smaller shipbuiding yards into Aker. With the acquisition of Kvaerner, 
many more was joined, and Aker became the largest shipbuilder in Eu-
rope, with 20000 employees in 17 yards around the world.49 The ship-
building division was sold in 2007, and was soon bought by the South 
Korean STX Europe. Later, Italian Fincantieri took over ownership. Some 
of the small yards on the west coast went through a series of ownership 
changes during this process.
Commercial conditions for building ships in Norway were now 
quite different from those prevailing in the 1970s and 80s. Today capital 
running Norwegian yards is less bound to production facilities. Instead of 
seeking orders to keep its yard running,   corporations tend to first secure 
orders and thereafter buy a yard that fits the task. Yard ownership has be-
come a more short-sighted obligation. What still ties owners’ interests to 
the social realities of the economic life is the competence which the yard 
organization represents. Without the expertise and routine of engineers, 
49 Ankerløkken-eventyret.
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plate workers, pipe fitters, welders and electricians, profitable production 
would be difficult. Quite often, when a yard is bought by a new owner, 
employees stay, such that local yard organizations tend to be preserved 
through ownership changes. Surprisingly in spite of this trend and strong 
oscillations in markets, many yard sites are still in business, 
If we take a look at official statistics again, we see that by the end 
of the 1980s the shipbuilding industry had suffered a serious setback. In 
2000, the number of workers employed in ship-building was reduced to 
less than half of those employed in the offshore sector.50 Yet, many yards 
were still active. In part such reduction was due to the fact that some jobs 
were exported. The yards no longer tried to compete with low-cost coun-
tries for steel work. Orders placed with Norwegian firms usually involved 
having the hull built abroad, at first quite often in Poland, while the design, 
other engineering work, and the outfitting were done in Norway. More-
over, ship types had changed into more complex and technologically ad-
vanced ones, for example chemical tankers, gas tankers and supply ships, 
though these last ones were small. Norwegian merchant fleets demanded 
far larger ships, and had them built abroad. Yards in Norway concentrated 
on niche markets where the value added was high per ton of steel. A large 
percentage was exported.51 The industry has experienced a production, 
market relations, and capital structure internationalisation. Takeovers by 
new owners may open opportunities in new markets. In 2019 there are al-
most no supply ships in order, but yards have contracts to build 16 smaller 
high standard cruise ships. The Vard group, owned by italian Fincantieri, 
are to build seven of them. Hulls are built in Vard’s yards in Romania, and 
equipped in Norway.52
At the formal level, labour relations in the industry remain un-
changed. In the dominating group Aker, union representatives have in-
fluence at all levels in the organisation and often play an important role 
in decision making. Internal relations in Aker is a good example of the 
reality of the Nordic Model. Their main characteristics are a high degree 
of mutual trust and of close cooperation between managers, engineers and 
production workers. In particular, they join forces in the never ending aim 
to lower production costs. Relations between workers’ representatives 
50 See table 3.
51 Osland (1992, 18)
52 Klassekampen 10.08. 2019.
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and management has probably become more intimate and based on faith. 
Workers are allowed more freedom in executing their tasks, that is at least 
do they have a degree of influence over their own work. This development 
does not seem to change local union representatives’ determination to de-
fend what they conceive as the rights of their members. But, with their 
inclusion in discussions about how to run the workplace, they also tend 
to   understand management’s point of view in upcoming issues. Union 
representatives in Aker have access to much of the same information as 
top managers, and will renounce on claims if it is a question of the firm’s 
survival. At the same time, formal industrial relations are intact on all lev-
els, and the national union is still influential.
On the other hand, the workers’ local unions are not in the same 
strong position as earlier. Since the 1990s, irms have downsized their 
permanent work forces and rely on large groups of temporary workers 
hired from manpower firms. In October 2019, for example, the number 
of temporary workers at the Aker yard at Stord is twice the number of the 
permanent ones. Few of the short-term employed are organized. The same 
situation prevails in many yards.53 The high grade of organisation which 
characterized yard workers is reduced. This means that the majority of the 
employed are not part of the relations of cooperation in which the perma-
nent workers are included. They may also be unable to communicate with 
each other because they speak different languages.
8. Concluding remarks
The firms of the shipbuilding industry managed to establish produc-
tion based on efficient technical and organisational principles in the years 
following the Second World War, and to expand production and employ-
ment until the crisis of the 1970s. Undoubtedly, a condition for this was that 
the firms managed to attract capital needed for investments that enabled the 
transition to the new production system. Political regulations contributed 
to this by making shipbuilding profitable. When the system yielded gains 
through cost reductions during the whole period, this owed much to the 
cooperative attitude of the workers. Through their local unions they partici-
pated actively in productivity work, with constant increases in productivity 
on the premise that they would get a share in productivity gains.
53 Klassekampen 11.10. 2019.
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Later on, the development of a market for oil extractions offshore 
installations represented new market opportunities for several shipbuild-
ing yards, which in terms of employments is nowadays more important 
than the actual building of ships. Direct state intervention secured a posi-
tion in the market for Norwegian yards. Intensified global competition that 
Norwegian firms experienced from the 1990s on, aggravated by the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 and several instances of oil price reductions, intensified 
the pressure for cost reductions, made its impact on industrial strategies, 
and led firms to be more internationally oriented.
The yard industry of today is a very different business and work-
place compared to what it was in the early postwar years. Production in 
general is high-tech, firms are more integrated by common ownership, 
and production units in part of the industry are more prone to be sold and 
bought. Capital concentration has become very high in parts of the branch, 
and domestic competition is quite reduced. The core of the industry, pro-
ducing the huge constructions for the offshore industry, is to a large extent 
controlled by one firm, Aker. But this part of the industry is exposed to 
global competition to an extent which can be compared to the situation in 
the supertanker era. 
The workforce employed in the yards has also changed. Manpow-
er today is more qualified, with a larger share of engineers and skilled 
workers having higher and more specialised skills in a high-value activity. 
The steel work that until the 1970s was the most important, is now almost 
always outsourced to other countries. It has become commercially almost 
impossible to build hulls in Norway. Instead, they may be built as far away 
as China, to be later equipped at yards in Norway.
Seen from the point of view of individual production units, work 
security has been reduced due to the more frequent acquisitions and sell-
outs by capital operating in a global arena. Even if the units often continue 
operating under new owners, such changes influence the bargaining power 
of employees’ unions.  Recourse to hiring temporary workers works in 
the same direction. Conditions of organized working life in this branch of 
industry have also have changed considerably in this branch of industry 
that traditionally had a strongly organized work force.
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Appendix
Table 1
Employment in the shipbuilding industry relative to the metal indus-
try and industry
Industry Metal industry Shipbuilding 
industry
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1950 6.166 257.399 1.391 72.859 85 17.702 28,3 6,9
1955 7.677 293.975 1.708 83.111 61 19.123 28,3 6,5
1960 8.672 307.610 2.000 89.538 88 20.010 29,1 6,5
1965 18.238 367.518 4.577 112.132 96 23.152 30,5 6,3
1970 14.990 369.871 3.397 116.772 162 28.397 31,6 7,7
1975 14.357 383174 2.275 131.911 224 32.736 34,4 8,5
Source: Statistical Yearbook several years, and Industrial Statistics, 
Statistics Norway.
Table 2. 
Firms building and repairing steel ships after size, 1941 and 1972
1941 1972
Firms Employed Employed 
per firm
Firms Employed Employed 
per firm
Large 
firms
18 8.850 491,7 16 19.159 1.197,40
Medium 
sized
61 26.609 436
Small 
firms
105 3.484 33,2 133 3.473 28,1
All firms 123 12.334 100,3 194 30.352 156,4
Sources: Aamundsen 1941:18f., NOU 1973:58: 8ff, and Production 
statistics, Industrial statistics, Statistics Norway.
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Table 3
Total output of shipbuilding in Norway, 
new ships built for Norwegian shipping firms and she share built in 
Norway, 1957-1990
Total 
output
Built in Norway Built abroad Share of tonnage 
built in Norway
Grt Ships Grt Ships Grt Percent
1957 197 60 185 78 722 20,4
1960 243,2 38 266 51 532 33,3
1965 474,2 56 366 75 1686 17,8
1970 706 64 464 46 1762 20,8
1975 1073 62 585 93 2572 18,5
1980 34 105 10 373 22
1985 20 72 14 496 12,7
1990 19 17 20 481 3,4
(Concerns merchant vessels of more than 100 grt.)
Source: Historisk statistikk 1994, table 20.9.
Table 4
Establishments and number of employed 1970 – 2000
38411 building of ships. I 1000 kr 38241 Manufacture 
of oil and gas well 
machinery (Oil rigs, 
from 1993: 1993: Oil 
platforms)
Total
Year Establish-
ments
Persons 
engaged
Establish-
ments
Persons 
engaged
Establish-
ments
Persons 
engaged
1970 162 28397 162 28397
1975 224 32736 38 7602 262 40338
1980 216 27375 57 10050 273 37425
1985 142 13609 84 15821 226 29430
1990 126 10079 75 14248 201 24327
1995 111 9527 79 17906 190 27433
2000 162 8498 105 19658 267 28156
2007 485 21441
2010 449 22522
2015 422 25702
2017 382 18229
Source: Industrial statistics, Statistics Norway
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9. Sources used
Most of the statistical material quoted in this article comes from 
Statistic Norway, the state bureau. In addition, we have also drawn on a 
survey conducted in 1941 by yard manager C.N.R. Aamundsen . Special 
government commissions in the 1970s collected statistical overviews over 
the major firms, published in NOU 1973:58, NOU 1974:51 and 1978:4. 
The yearly reports of the Branch Council for the Shipbuilding Industry, as 
summarized by the national union of metalworkers, is quoted as a source 
for both statistical data and industrial policies.
The material on the Aker Group and its Stord yard is collected by 
members of a research group focusing on industrial relations in the 1990s: 
Grove and Heiret 1996, Mjelva 1995 and 2005 and Haga 1989. In 2018 
and 2019, we participated in aproject to write the history of the yard to-
gether with Martin Byrkjeland, Knut Grove, Trond Erlien and Eva-Marie 
Tveit (Byrkjeland & al. 2019). We have consulted the yard archive and 
conducted extensive interviews with people in key positions in the firm, 
many of them with a carreer at the yard starting in the 1980s. The inter-
views are the most important sources for our discussion of technical and 
economic development since the crisis of the 1970s.
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